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We describe the trajectory of pension reform in the United Kingdom, which has 
focussed on keeping the cost of public pension programmes down during a period of 
steady population ageing whilst attempting to maintain an adequate minimum level 
of income security for low income households in retirement.  Instruments for 
achieving these aims have been to target public benefits on low income households, 
permitting individuals to opt out of the second tier of the public programme into 
private retirement accounts, and the use of tax incentives to encourage additional 
private retirement saving.  Frequent reforms to the pension programme raise the 
question of whether households can make reasonable private retirement saving 
provision in the light of growing complexity and potential shortcomings in 
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Pension Provision and Retirement Saving:  
Lessons from the United Kingdom 
 
1.  Introduction 
With steady population ageing, the United Kingdom (UK) public pension 
programme faces challenges shared by many other European countries.  These arise 
from the conflict between maintaining real income levels in retirement for current and 
future pensioners and at the same time not adding to public budgetary pressure; a 
conflict that has led to political gridlock and stalemate in pension reform in several 
countries.  The UK, in contrast, seems to have embraced pension reform with 
enthusiasm – the frequency of major reforms, which occurred roughly every decade 
(1975, 1986, 1995) seems to have accelerated recently with significant reform 
measures announced in 1998, 2002 and 2006 and a series of major changes coming 
into force in 1999, 2001, 2002 and 2006.   
The enthusiasm for pension reform is the UK is something of a puzzle – 
although it may be a combination of the flexibility of the UK’s mixed (and 
complicated) system of public and private retirement provision coupled with a series 
of governments with dominant parliamentary majorities that have contributed to the 
reform impetus.  It is striking, for example, given the ‘short-termism’ of much 
political debate, that reforms were introduced in 1986 in the UK explicitly raised costs 
of public pension provision to current taxpayers whilst reducing costs to future 
generations of taxpayers (although, as will be described shortly, in retrospect the 
current costs were understated and the future gains in terms of reduced public 
spending significantly overstated).   
As a result of the UK’s reform process, the Economic Policy Committee of the 
European Commission (2001) noted that, whilst the share of public pension spending 
on people aged 55 and over as a % of GDP was projected to rise on average among 
EU countries from 10.4% in 2000 to 13.6% in 2040, the share of public pensions in 
GDP in the UK would fall from 5.5% to 5.0% over the same period.
1  These disparate 
                                                 
1    It should however be noted that several components of public transfer payments to pensioners are 
excluded from the EPC’s definition and that total public pension spending in the UK (and indeed some 
other countries) is somewhat higher than suggested in this document.  Moreover recent reforms in the 
UK will probably increase public pension spending by 2040 rather than reduce it, although the likely 
increase of around 1 percentage point is well below the average increase.  The UK of course has a 
much higher share of spending on private pensions as a % of GDP than most other EU countries.   2
trends have arisen despite comparable demographic trends between the UK and the 
rest of Europe.  And, while public pension spending is low in the UK by European 
standards, as will be demonstrated shortly the UK public pension programme is rather 
successful in delivering high replacement rates of pension benefits to working 
incomes for low income individuals, and seems likely to continue to do so.
2 
These substantial successes must be seen against the growing complexity of 
pension provision in the UK arising from the frequency of reforms and the resulting 
long transition periods.  This inevitably raises the question of whether, in an 
environment where the majority of families will be required to engage in some private 
retirement saving in order to obtain a reasonable replacement rate in retirement, 
households are able to plan sensibly for retirement.  In effect, the reforms that have 
been announced in 2006 (Department for Work and Pensions, 2006a) cast doubt on 
this premise by indirectly inducing a quasi-mandatory component to private 
retirement saving (whilst also proposing reforms which if implemented would bring 
about a welcome simplification to the public programme of pension provision). 
In the light of these various issues, this paper is structured in the following 
manner.  The next section gives some background on the evolution of the UK’s public 
pension programme over time and on past and expected future pension replacement 
rates from the programme.  Sections 3 and 4 focus on private pensions and retirement 
saving.  The former examines the option by which individuals can contract-out of part 
of the UK public programme, the incentives implied by this feature of the programme 
and the evidence on individual behaviour.  Section 4 examines the changes in tax 
reliefs applied to retirement saving and again how these have affected individual 
behaviour.  The final section draws together the implications of these analyses and 
discusses briefly the plans for further reform of the UK programme that are being 
implemented at the end of 2006. 
2.  The UK’s public pension programme: A brief evaluation 
The UK’s public pension programme (social security programme in North 
American parlance) shares some similarities with Canada insofar as there are three 
                                                 
2   Again the qualification is required that these replacement rate calculations often assume that 
households will claim all benefits to which they are entitled and this is not always the case where 
benefits are income-tested.  This may be why several studies suggest that poverty rates are relatively 
high among UK pensioners but care is needed in drawing such conclusions: for an exhaustive analysis 
of the OECD data on cross-country pensioner poverty, see Disney and Whitehouse (2001).    3
components: a flat pension (the Basic State Pension), an earnings-related component 
(the State Earnings-Related Pension – SERPS – replaced in 2001 by the State Second 
Pension – S2P), and an income-tested component known most recently as the 
Minimum Income Guarantee and then the Pension Credit. 
The flat pension is the oldest part of the programme, dating from 1946 and is 
the remaining vestige of the Beveridge plan introduced after World War 2.  Paying a 
flat contributory pension to men after 65 and women after 60,
3 this pension in 
payment has been formally indexed to prices rather than earnings since November 
1980 and has fallen as a share of retirement income since that time. Current 
(December 2006) proposals intend to restore the link to earnings in 2012. 
The second component of the programme is the earnings-related pension.   
SERPS was introduced in 1978 under legislation in 1975 and was designed to provide 
an additional pension for those who did not have access to a company pension plan.  
The rules governing this component of the pension programme have undergone 
several changes since that time, with cutbacks in generosity in the mid-1980s and 
mid-1990s, and changes in formulae since 1998 (and a rebranding as S2P) that have 
tended to make the benefit formula more redistributive towards low earners (Disney 
and Emmerson, 2005, give fuller details).  Another complexity is that while 
SERPS/S2P revalues past earnings in line with an index of earnings in calculating 
entitlements, the floors, ceilings and pensions in payment under this part of the 
programme have typically been revalued in line with price inflation. 
The final component of the public programme is a means-tested benefit, which 
has existed in one form or another as a national programme since 1948.  The most 
significant changes in this component of the programme have occurred recently: in an 
attempt to increase the overall generosity of the programme to poorer pensioners, in 
1999 the government decided to index the then Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG) to 
earnings rather than prices.  In a further important development, in 2003 the MIG was 
renamed the Pension Credit and the withdrawal rate of 100% relative to outside 
income was reduced to 40% on income above the value of the full Basic State 
                                                 
3      Between 2010 and 2020, pension ages will be equalised between the sexes at age 65.  Under 
current (December 2006) legislative proposals, this joint pension age will rise to age 68 by 2046.  
There is no scope for early retirement on reduced benefits in the contributory system although there 
may be other ‘routes’ into early retirement, notably disability benefits, whilst individuals with company 
pension plans may also choose to leave the labour market at an earlier stage. For example the majority 
of current public sector workers are able to receive unreduced occupational pensions from age 60.   4
Pension.  The Pension Credit programme now took on the guise of a tax credit, 
reflecting the Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown’s liking for such 
programmes.  At a stroke, this increase in generosity extended current and future 
eligibility for means-tested benefits further up the pensioner income distribution.   
This greater emphasis on means-testing rather than universality of provision 
has been a controversial measure given the budgetary cost (although the government 
has correctly argued that earnings-indexing the flat pension throughout this period 
would have been more costly and would have benefited relatively well off pensioners) 
and the perceived disincentives for individuals eligible for the Pension Credit to 
acquire additional retirement income (either by saving more or retiring later).  A 
critique of price-indexing the flat pension while earnings-indexing the Pension Credit 
was a central plank of the so-called Turner Report (Pensions Commission, 2005) 
which has, to a large extent, underpinned the current reform proposals. 
What has this multi-tiered programme delivered?  Charts 1(a) and 1(b), taken 
from Disney and Emmerson (2005) illustrate past and prospective replacement rates 
from the UK’s public pension programme, for two stylised individuals retiring at age 
65 in each year from 1948 to 2050, relative to a person aged 50.  One individual is 
assumed to be on the lifetime trajectory of male median earnings at each age of his (or 
her) life (Chart 1a). The second individual is assumed to be on female median 
earnings at each age of her (or his) life and also benefits from the relatively generous 
treatment of individuals who have caring responsibilities and thus accrue retirement 
pension credits during such periods of absence from the workforce (Chart 1b).
4  The 
charts do not take account of prospective changes announced in the White Paper of 
May 2006 and the subsequent Pensions Bill of November 2006.
5    
                                                 
4   To calculate these charts, data from a long series of Family Expenditure surveys were used to 
calculate the median earnings at every age for each individual retiring at age 65 in each year.  Given 
these calculated age-earnings profiles, entitlements to the various benefits could be calculated.  For 
periods outside the available sample data, projections and backcasts assumed average earnings growth 
and similarly shaped age-earnings profiles to those calculated within the sample data period.   
5  But, summarising the implications of these changes, from 2012 these should level out the 
replacement rate derived from the flat pension and thereby squeeze out the role of income-tested 
benefits for the person on median male earnings.  A proposed simplification of the cohort-specific 
accrual rates in the earnings-related pension will tend to smooth out, but not eliminate the decline in its 
importance, since present proposals continue to price index benefits in payment from this component of 
the programme. For estimates of the increase in state pension income at state pension age see 
Emmerson, Tetlow and Wakefield (2006).   5
For the individual on average male earnings, the salient features are (i) the 
initial dependence on the flat pension until the late 1970s (ii) the decline in 
importance of the flat pension after it’s indexation to prices from 1981 and the 
growing importance of the earnings-related state pension until the turn of the century 
(iii) the decline in importance of the contributory programme as a whole after the turn 
of the century and the growing important of benefits from the income-tested 
component and (iv) the overall low level of earnings replacement, peaking at around 
the turn of the century. 
For the individual on average female earnings with credits for home 
responsibility (absence from the workforce) the key features are (i) the much higher 
replacement rate than the average earner (ii) the importance of the flat pension in the 
early years and the importance of the income-tested Pension Credit to later cohorts, 
and (iii) the shift towards a more redistributive structure to the earnings-related 
benefit for later cohorts, which again raises replacement rates for lower earners 
relative to Chart 1(a). 
These charts illustrate both the success of the programme in targeting higher 
replacement rates on low lifetime earners and the relatively low replacement rates, by 
international standards, for the average earner.  For the latter, additional retirement 
saving would seem essential in order to raise replacement rates to a sufficient 
standard.
6  The variations in overall replacement rates across cohorts and the changing 
composition of benefits illustrates clearly the effects of both the complexity of 
provision (including, for example, different accrual rates in SERPS for each cohort by 
birth date) and, crucially, the consequences of the vagaries of indexation procedures 
applied to the different pension components, and to the ceilings and floors in the 
programme.
7  (In this respect, recent Canadian policy to index all components of the 
programme to a single indicator seems more appropriate.)  Some individuals will 
potentially retire with entitlements from four different public programmes in the next 
few years (the Basic State Pension, SERPS, S2P, the Pension Credit); indeed if they 
                                                 
6   This of course begs the question of what is an appropriate replacement rate in retirement.  Space 
does not permit a full discussion of this issue here. 
7   By way of illustration, at certain times the upper limit on earnings eligible for SERPS have been 
indexed to prices while the eligible earnings themselves are revalued in line with an earnings index; the 
limits on contributions have been differentially indexed from the limits on benefits, the thresholds for 
entitlement to means-tested benefits are indexed to earnings while the contributory system is indexed to 
prices, and so on.  It is not always clear that policy-makers, let alone participants in the system, have at 
the time of implementing reforms understood the implications of these details for long run entitlements.   6
have low retirement incomes they may also be entitled to other income-tested benefits 
which provide support towards housing costs and local tax bills.  It is hard for 
analysts, let alone programme beneficiaries, in such circumstances to work out the 
prospective retirement income (and the extent to which it is withdrawn against 
additional retirement income) to be obtained from the public system.  This drawback 
must be weighed against the undoubted successes of the UK’s public programme. 
3.  Private provision 1: Opting-out of public provision  
An unusual aspect of the UK’s programme is that it permits individuals to opt 
out of part of the public pension programme – the earnings-related component – for 
all or part of their working lives, either as a member of an opted-company pension 
plan or through purchase of an individual retirement plan from a private insurer.  By 
opting-out, known as ‘contracting-out’ in UK parlance, individuals lose entitlement to 
the SERPS/S2P component for so long as they remain opted out, but during that time 
pay lower social security contributions (called the National Insurance contribution) 
into the programme.  If they opt-out as part of a company pension plan, the joint 
employer-employee National Insurance contribution is simply reduced pro rata.  If 
the individual has purchased an approved personal pension, the contracted-out 
‘rebate’ (the difference between the opted-in and opted-out social security 
contribution) is transferred by the Department for Work and Pensions directly to the 
insurer with whom the individual has contracted, and then paid into that individual’s 
account.  In both cases, the company plan and the individual account, the employee 
and their employee are able to make additional tax-relieved contributions to their 
private pension (which is the subject of the next section).
8 
Historically, contracting-out arose because company pension plans pre-dated 
the introduction of SERPS in 1978.  The government was anxious not to drive private 
defined benefit company plans out of business by providing a competing product, and 
so provided for a reduction in contributions to approved company plans so long as 
they took responsibility for paying second-tier benefits in retirement.
9  The normal 
public economic theory critique of allowing contracting-out of a publicly-provided 
                                                 
8   And of course individuals can contribute tax-relieved amounts to private retirement accounts 
whether they are contracted-out or not. 
9    In fact the rebate was over-generous to the average company plan – see Disney and Whitehouse 
(1993).   7
good – that it allows the low risk individuals to opt out – is arguably less appropriate 
here as the higher earning employees who were typically covered by company plans 
were likely to be long-lived and thus the ‘higher risk’ in terms of pension (annuity) 
insurance. 
The novel policy, and the starting point of our analysis of retirement saving 
incentives, arose in the late 1980s when the Thatcher administration wished to 
encourage greater opting-out from the public pension programme, and so permitted 
not just existing occupational defined benefit plans but also group defined 
contribution pensions and individual retirement accounts known as Personal Pensions 
to opt out of the public programme.  The latter (unexpectedly) proved much the most 
popular.  As mentioned before, individuals who opted-out in order to buy a Personal 
Pension from an insurer could have their rebate of social security contributions 
transferred to their privately administered pension account and could supplement this, 
if they chose, with additional tax-relieved saving.  Individuals could at any time re-
contract back into SERPS, in which case their personal pension fund would continue 
to accrue and they would also accrue SERPS entitlements for the period during which 
they remained in SERPS.  Alternatively individuals could remain contracted-in to 
SERPS but start up a personal pension account and contribute their own saving just as 
with a North American account such as an IRA or RRSP. 
The government’s Department of Social Security used a working assumption 
that half a million people would choose to contract out of SERPS and opt to put their 
contracted-out rebate into a Personal Pension, although a contingency plan allowed 
for up to one and three quarter million optants (Disney and Whitehouse, 1992).  In the 
event, roughly six million personal pension contracts had been approved by 1992 
from their introduction in 1988, the bulk of them in the first year.  The cost to the 
government of this mass exodus from the public pension programme, in terms of the 
reduction in public pension contributions arising from the transfer of contracted-out 
rebates to personal pension optants over the period 1988-1993, was estimated to be 
£9.3 billions in 1991 values.  It was simultaneously estimated by the government’s 
spending ‘watchdog’, the National Audit Office, that this would lead to a prospective 
reduction in future spending on public pensions (SERPS) of £3.4 billion (National 
Audit Office, 1991).  Overall, this policy therefore represented a net cost to the   8
government of almost £6 billion, labelled by the Financial Times on 4
th January 1991 
as ‘The pensions débâcle’. 
Why was take-up so underestimated?  The total rebate of contributions that the 
individual could choose to put in a Personal Pension or retain in the public 
programme, SERPS, was 5.8% of earnings.  As an extra ‘bonus’ to start up the new 
personal pension programme, for a finite period the government offered an additional 
2% contribution to those individuals who chose a Personal Pension.  Since these 
rebate contributions were exempt from income tax, tax relief was added to the sum 
invested, so that the opted-out individual was effectively being given 8.46% of 
earnings to invest in the private pension market, at a time when pension funds were 
accumulating double-digit annual real returns, albeit in equity-dominated portfolios.  
Conversely, the 5.8% ‘invested’ in SERPS could expect an internal rate of return of 
little more than 1% in real terms.
10  This policy was therefore seen as a one-way bet, 
and it is not surprising that so many people took advantage of the new opportunity to 
opt out of the social security programme. 
There is, however, a more subtle incentive issue, insofar as the incentive to 
switch from SERPS to a Personal Pension was much greater for young people – 
indeed at plausible rates of return (net of investment risk), older workers had no 
incentive to switch at all.  This is a rather more stringent test of consumer ‘rationality’ 
in as much as younger people are typically portrayed as having little interest in 
pensions, high discount rates, myopia and so on and might be expected to be 
relatively indifferent to pension incentives.  The reason why the incentive was greater 
for younger workers is reasonably intuitive.  In a defined benefit pension plan such as 
SERPS, the return, in terms of higher pension, from one more year’s membership 
depends on the trajectory of earnings and the number of accrued years of rights.   
Since earnings rise over the lifetime but past accrued rights in the public programme 
are revalued in line with average earnings growth, the marginal accrual from 
remaining in the public programme is roughly invariant to age.  Conversely, by the 
simple fact of compound interest, investment in a personal pension is front-loaded: a 
contribution at a younger age on average accumulates a greater return by retirement 
                                                 
10   For international evidence on internal rates of return to public pension contributions in the UK and 
elsewhere (including Canada) see Disney (2004, 2006).   9
than a later contribution, so giving a disproportion incentive to young people to take-
up the contracting-out option.   
Charts 2a and 2b examine the age structure of new optants for Personal 
Pensions in each year from 1987-88 (tax year) to 2003-04, taken from administrative 
data, for men and women respectively.  Around 90% of new contracts until the mid-
1990s were taken up by individuals aged under 40, well over half by individuals aged 
under 30 and, remarkably, a significant proportion of optants were aged under 20.   It 
should be noted that many of these contracts, at least in the initial years, were ‘rebate 
only’: that is the individuals did not add any extra contributions of their own; 
nevertheless these figures imply that young individuals, or their advisers, were by no 
means as short-sighted as is often asserted by advocates of greater compulsion in 
retirement saving provision.  The age structure of optants also contrasts strongly with 
similar studies of take-up of retirement accounts in North America although the 
incentives there are of course quite different. 
It will also be noticed from Chart 2 that the age structure of new contracts 
began to change in the latter part of the 1990s for both men and women.  Indeed there 
is evidence of a distinct break in the series for men in 1997, with a shift in the 
proportion of older new optants.  This is no coincidence as another reform was 
introduced in that year which changed the relative incentives by age.  The background 
to this reform can be understood by noting our earlier comment that flat incentives to 
opt-out are ‘front-loaded’ towards younger age groups.  Clearly, if we allowed the 
contracted-out rebate to vary by age, it would be possible to minimise the intra-
marginal subsidies to younger earners by reducing the rebate for younger age groups, 
while raising the rebate for older age groups so as to give an incentive to opt-out (or 
remain opted-out rather than re-contract back in to SERPS).  Research at the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies (Disney and Whitehouse, 1992) and elsewhere in financial 
institutions demonstrated what this optimal structure of age-related contracted-out 
rebates would look like, and such a policy was introduced in 1997 under 1995 
legislation.  This amendment to the relative incentives changed the age structure of 
new optants towards older people of working age, as demonstrated in Chart 2.  It also 
reduced the number of Personal Pension holders to lower levels since the ‘one way 
bet’ had been eliminated and the loss of current contribution revenue minimised.     10
Nevertheless, some commentators took this fall in the number of Personal Pension 
optants as evidence of ‘policy failure’. 
What was the impact of all this on saving in Personal Pensions?  Initially, net 
new retirement saving in Personal Pensions was very probably low given the high 
level of the contacted-out rebate.  Rebate contributions (indicated by the line ‘DSS’ in 
Chart 3) far exceeded contributions from employees and employers in the early 
1990s.  Permitting individuals to invest their contributions in a pension fund accruing 
high returns rather than a public programme with low returns induced a sizeable 
positive wealth effect which might have been expected to reduce overall retirement 
saving despite the incentives to contribute additional amounts arising from the tax 
reliefs described in the next section.   However, as the value of rebates was cut back 
in the late 1990s, arising in part from the change to age-related contracted-out rebates 
described previously, we observe a steady rise in Chart 3 in the value of additional 
contributions by employees or employers.  Some of this amount may of course have 
substituted for other kinds of saving, including other pension saving, but this 
nevertheless strongly implies that the cut in rebates also increased the amount of 
‘free’ retirement saving channelled through Personal Pensions. 
4.  The effect of tax reliefs on retirement saving in the UK 
In 2001, the Labour government introduced an alternative to existing Personal 
Pensions: the Stakeholder Pension.  The Green Paper (Department of Social Security, 
1998) that proposed Stakeholder Pensions argued that provision of private pensions 
was inadequate in significant respects – employer-provided pension plans 
predominantly covered only public sector workers and higher earners in the private 
sector, and coverage was no longer growing. Labour had also criticised Personal 
Pensions for their high upfront administrative charges, and they were seen as suitable 
only for persistent and higher income savers.  In contrast, low earners were thought to 
be better off contracted in to the public second tier pension (the State Earnings-
Related Pension Scheme, SERPS, superseded in April 2002 by the more redistributive 
State Second Pension, S2P).  The Green Paper therefore argued that: 
“People on middle incomes want to save more for retirement but current 
pension arrangements are often unsuitable or expensive. Our new secure, 
flexible and value-for-money stakeholder pension schemes will help many 
middle earners to save for a comfortable retirement.” (ibid, p. 48)   11
Like Personal Pensions, Stakeholder Pensions are ‘defined contribution’ 
schemes, in that pension benefits depend on the accumulated value of the fund. They 
differ from Personal Pensions, however, in having compulsory minimum standards, a 
different governance structure, guaranteed workplace access for those working for 
moderate or large employers, and a simpler and more uniform charging structure. 
Since 2001, companies employing at least five people that do not offer 
occupational pensions are required to: nominate a Stakeholder Pension provider after 
consultation with employees; provide employees with information on Stakeholder 
Pensions; and, channel employees’ contributions to the nominated pension provider. 
Neither employees nor employers are compelled to contribute to a Stakeholder 
Pension and indeed firms employing less than five people were completely exempted 
from the requirement to nominate a provider.  Nor are employees ‘auto-enrolled’ into 
the nominated Stakeholder Pension – the default option in such companies is S2P (the 
public pension programme).  Finally, Stakeholder Pensions had a simple charging 
structure: an initial annual cap on charges was set at 1% of the fund, with no charges 
either upfront or on withdrawals from the fund.
11   
Despite the fanfare of the launch of this new retirement saving instrument, the 
evidence suggests that the introduction of Stakeholder Pensions failed to increase the 
overall proportion of individuals saving through pension plans for retirement.  In the 
two years preceding Stakeholder Pensions (1999 and 2000), on average 61% of the 
workforce belonged to a pension plan of some type.  In the two years after the 
introduction, 60% belonged to a pension plan.  Among the ‘target’ group of middle 
earners, coverage by private pension plans in general actually fell by 2.4 percentage 
points between these periods.  The general consensus in the finance industry and in 
government was that Stakeholder Pensions had had little or no effect on retirement 
saving or on pension plan coverage.  Unlike Personal Pensions, where policy failure 
apparently took the form of excessive take-up, here the apparent policy failure was 
insufficient take-up.  The Stakeholder Pension outcome may have strongly influenced 
the views of the Pensions Commission (2005) that voluntarism was of limited use in 
encouraging retirement saving and that individuals should be presented with a ‘default 
                                                 
11  In 2004, after lobbying from the finance industry, the Treasury increased this charge cap from 1% to 
1½% for the first 10 years that a product is held. For more details see HM Treasury (2004).   12
option’ of saving through an employer-provided retirement saving account unless they 
made some suitable provision of their own.   
Chung et al (2006) analyse the trends in Stakeholder Pension coverage by 
earnings band formally using a ‘treatment model’ (taking high earners as the 
‘control’) on household data from the Family Resources Survey.  They confirm the 
aggregate data and the general consensus that Stakeholder Pensions did not increase 
coverage among the middle-earning group.  Interestingly, however, they find 
evidence that take-up of private pensions increased among low earners after the 
introduction of Stakeholder Pensions, with a 3.6 percentage point (ppt) increase in 
coverage among low earners.  Further investigation in that paper shows that the 
strongest effect is a 5.2 ppt increase among low earners married to medium or high 
earners.  These are not trivial changes in coverage.  Do they lead us to revise our 
opinion on the impact on coverage of Stakeholder Pensions?    
To understand the likely reasons for this change, it is useful to examine how 
the UK tax system treats contributions to retirement saving accounts such as Personal 
and Stakeholder Pensions.  Contributions to retirement saving accounts made by 
individuals in the UK attract relief against income tax up to a ceiling (the UK direct 
tax system is individual-based).  This means that money contributed to retirement 
saving accounts obtains a tax rebate added to the contributions to the account.
12  Until 
the advent of Stakeholder Pensions, the ceiling was proportional to earnings and more 
generous for older individuals.  It is illustrated in Chart 4a.  As discussed in the 
previous section, compound interest implies that older savers need to save more to 
obtain a given target retirement income than younger savers (starting from identical 
assets) and this perhaps provided a rationale for the increase in contribution limits as a 
percentage of earnings with age.   
An important difference between the post-Stakeholder Pension tax regime and 
the previous tax regime, also introduced in 2001, is that all individuals, irrespective of 
earnings or age, are able to make gross contributions of up to £3,600 a year to their 
private pension (whether it be a stakeholder pension or another form of private 
pension).  This change in tax reliefs, illustrated in Chart 4b, disproportionately affects 
low and zero earners, and especially younger workers.  Those with very low earnings 
                                                 
12  The rebate is credited at the basic rate of income tax – higher tax rate payers can claim additional 
relief.   13
would need a source of resources in order to save in a pension, and the Green Paper 
(1998) noted one possible consequence of the change in tax reliefs:  
“The changes will also make it easier for partners to contribute to each 
other’s pensions, again within the overall contribution limits, should they 
choose to do so.” (ibid, p.63) 
Evidence in current ongoing research by the authors of the present paper 
confirms that the changing take-up of personal pensions since 2001 is almost certainly 
a result of the change in tax reliefs depicted in Chart 4.  The reform allows us to 
undertake a straightforward ‘treatment model’ that differentiates the post-2001 
behaviour of households affected by the change in contribution limits from the 
behaviour of households that are unaffected by this change.  Our results suggest that 
take-up of private pensions increases by some 3 percentage points more among non-
zero earners who were affected by the reform than among those who were not 
affected.  Take-up in both single households and couples increases by more among 
those affected by the reform; in the latter case, women are more likely to increase 
their take-up rate than men.  Our evidence also suggests an increase in contributions 
to private pensions among those affected by the reform: only around £0.8 (C$1.5) per 
week for singles but around £4.3 (C$8) per week per individual in couples.  The latter 
figure, in particular, is again not small.  These results indicate that the reform may 
have had a redistributive aspect from men to women, but also implies that couples 
with one high earner and one low earner can engage in tax planning so as to minimise 
their tax liability by exploiting the higher joint ceilings on pension tax reliefs arising 
from the change.  If increased retirement saving by low earning wives is a beneficial 
side-effect of the reform, this is to be encouraged; however it is arguable that there 
might be other, more direct, instruments which would obtain an increase in women’s 
pensions without the potential for tax avoidance that may lie behind the observed 
behaviour. 
Whatever the pros and cons of the change in tax reliefs, the evidence from the 
treatment model suggests, again, that individuals who stood to gain from the reform 
responded to it.  Although middle earners as whole were the headline ‘target’ of the 
reform, there is no evidence of a response among that group as a whole.  This is not 
surprising as there was no extra incentive for this group to benefit from the reform 
(and in fact private pension coverage was already relatively high among this group).    14
Unlike Personal Pensions, the reform has been largely labelled a failure because it had 
no effect on aggregate take-up and because there was no evidence of additional take-
up among the ‘target’ group.  However, our analysis implies that private pension 
coverage would have fallen faster than it actually did between 1999 and 2002 had it 
not been for this reform.  Nor should it be too surprising that overall coverage, and 
contributions to pension plans in general, fell over this period with falling annuity 
rates and equity returns, greater uncertainty over pensions, and rising house prices all 
combining to induce households to change the structure of their wealth portfolio.
13  
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that this episode influenced the next change in 
direction of UK pension policy, which is discussed briefly in the next, and final, 
section.   
5.  Implications, and the current direction of UK reform 
  Our analysis has described a series of policy initiatives intended to increase 
private retirement saving by the introduction of new instruments.  For different 
reasons, described in the previous two sections, the original Personal Pension and 
Stakeholder Pension reforms were subsequently seen as inadequate policy responses 
to the retirement saving issue.   
At the heart of the analysis of the Pensions Commission (2005), which 
underpinned the round of pension reforms that began in 2006, were two central tenets.  
First, the public programme was too complex and had, since 2002, placed too much 
reliance of means-testing as a means of raising the incomes of future generations of 
lower income pensioners with the result that many middle-income individuals had a 
significant disincentive to save for retirement.
14 The response of the Commission, and 
of legislation before Parliament in 2006, was to simplify the programme and to reduce 
the emphasis on means-testing, as described previously in Section 2 of the present 
paper. 
                                                 
13   For a discussion of the implications of all this for the adequacy of wealth among those approaching 
retirement in England, see Banks et al (2005). 
14    There is of course a trade-off between a high overall tax burden arising from a generous universal 
public programme and a selective (means-tested) programme that has high disincentives for a small 
section of the programme. Welfare analysis (Feldstein, 1987), and empirical comparisons (Disney, 
2006) might suggest that a selective programme might then be preferable.  The problem with the UK 
programme, described in Section 2, was that the differential indexation of benefits meant that a 
growing proportion of pensioners would be subject to potential income-testing of saving over time. 
Sefton, et al (2006) use a stylised a simulation model and conclude that the introduction of the Pension 
Credit was welfare improving, but that extending the Pension Credit further up the income distribution, 
as implied by indexation prior to the 2006 proposals, might not be welfare improving.    15
Second, the Commission argued, there was a proliferation of evidence from 
surveys and experimental methods, as well as the outcomes of the Personal Pension 
and Stakeholder Pension ‘experiments’, to suggest that a purely voluntary approach to 
retirement saving was inappropriate.  Individuals had poor information and used it 
poorly; previous policies had failed to increase retirement saving to any significant 
extent.  This analysis places little weight on the evidence adduced here: that people 
did respond to the actual incentives embedded in previous reforms, and that if actual 
outcomes were sub-optimal, this might reflect failures of past policy rather than 
failures of individual rationality.  Of course, there is always a problem of looking at 
ex-post outcomes to assess the appropriateness of ex-ante decisions. Nevertheless it is 
apparent that the knowledge required for a household to implement an appropriate 
saving strategy is considerable and so it is not easy to dismiss the argument that 
greater prescription is required alongside simplification.
15 
A shift towards more prescription was embedded in the Pensions 
Commission’s proposal for a National Pension Saving Scheme (NPSS) and the 
Department for Work and Pensions accepted this proposal and will implement what it 
calls personal accounts.  Under these proposals, as of December 2006 (DWP, 2006b), 
all employees who are offered an occupational pension that meets certain minimum 
standards will be defaulted into that scheme – i.e. they have to choose to not join the 
scheme as opposed to having to choose to join the scheme. Those employees who are 
not offered such a scheme will, if they are aged over 21 and earn above £5,000 per 
year, be enrolled into a personal account to which they will, by default, contribute 4% 
of their earnings between £5,000 and £33,500. In addition their employers will 
contribute 3% and a 1% ‘contribution’ will come from the government on the same 
band of earnings.
16  Individuals are allowed to choose to change their own 
contribution level and even not to contribute at all – although if they contribute less 
than 4% then their employer will not have to contribute. The DWP estimates that 
there will be between 6 and 10 million members of personal accounts contributing £8 
billion a year, of which £4-5 billion will represent new saving.  
The contributions will be paid into a central clearing house, reducing costs of 
administering the fund. As a result the recent White Paper on personal accounts states 
                                                 
15     But see Scholz et al (2006). 
16    The self-employed will not be defaulted into a personal account, but they can choose to join if they 
wish. They will not of course, receive the 3% employer’s contribution.   16
that “The Government believes that personal accounts could deliver an AMC [annual 
management charge] possibly as low as 0.5 per cent in the short term and below 0.3 
per cent in the long term” (DWP, 2006b).  The asset management and portfolio 
structures are, at the time of writing, still the subject of consultation.   Unlike the 
Stakeholder Pension reform, this reform will apply to employers regardless of their 
size (and under these reforms employers with 5 or more employees will no longer 
have to designate a Stakeholder Pension scheme).  Finally, contracting-out is to be 
abolished for defined contribution (DC) schemes (although, at least for now, retained 
for approved defined benefit (DB) pension plans). 
How this will all be implemented, and the effects of the plan on retirement 
saving, are issues to be discussed in the future.  The traditional UK Treasury hostility 
to compulsory retirement saving plans has been reduced in relation to this reform for 
two reasons: first, because in the past contracting-out or similar incentives to private 
saving implied that the government was trading lower revenue now for lower pension 
payments in the future.  Here, however, contracting-out is to be abolished for all but 
DB pension plans so the burden of this reform falls squarely on individual employees 
and employers (bar the 1% government ‘contribution’).  This also produces greater 
uncertainty for existing DC plans where participants had contracted-out, as the 
incentive to continue saving in such plans is reduced by the lower annual management 
charges and the relative ease of operation of the new personal accounts.
17   Second, 
greater private saving by low and middle earners through personal accounts will 
reduce future claims on the means-tested sector, especially of Pension Credit, so 
reducing government spending.   
The counterpoint to this last argument, of course, is that individuals who are 
enrolled in personal accounts are effectively forgoing future public pension benefits, 
such as Pension Credit, so considerably reducing the effective ‘return’ on their own 
contributions.
18  The ‘cost’ in terms of lost means-tested benefits arising from auto-
enrolment is somewhat ameliorated by the greater generosity of the Basic State 
Pension under the new proposals, as described in Section 2.
19  The government has 
also argued that employees will be compensated for the 40% withdrawal rate of the 
                                                 
17    However as a result of the reform to rebates described in Section 3, many DC plans are no longer 
contracted-out in any event.  
18    This assumes that the Pension Credit programme would have remained in place in the future in its 
present form. 
19   For further discussion of all these points, see Pensions Policy Institute (2006).   17
Pension Credit by the mandatory employer’s contribution to the new saving scheme. 
While this is true, it is also true that the costs of this increase in (contingent) 
compulsory employer contributions will lead to a combination of higher prices, lower 
wages or lower investment returns, all of which, in isolation, will tend to reduce 
consumption.   
At the start of this paper, we noted the United Kingdom’s predilection for 
pension reform.  As the discussion of the Pensions Commission proposals and current 
legislative initiatives suggests, this enthusiasm for reform shows no sign of abating.  
The simplification of the public pension regime, and the move towards consistent 
indexation of different parameters ensuring that the system is stable over the longer 
term, that is contained in current legislation is to be welcomed. However the 
proposals come with a higher financing cost which will only be partially abated by 
progressively raising state pension age to 68 over the next three decades, and it 
remains to be seen whether this higher financing cost will be seen as acceptable.  The 
proposal for personal accounts is more interesting (especially in the North American 
context, where there has been much argument about the costs of developing a 
mandatory programme of individual retirement accounts).  This proposal has also 
been hotly debated in the UK, with some parts of the existing private pension industry 
and small businesses far from enthusiastic, and analysts pointing to the low return 
implicit in contributions to this scheme for low income earners if it is thought that the 
incidence of the employer contribution is actually to reduce wages.   
For the economist, the new reforms offer yet more, perhaps unwanted, 
opportunities for policy evaluation.  It is perhaps disappointing that new reforms in 
this field are proposed without taking account of a proper evaluation of past reform 
outcomes; certainly our analysis here suggests that unexpected or undesirable 
outcomes of previous reforms have arisen from poor policy design rather than from 
clear ‘economic irrationality’ of participants.  This suggests that the present reform 
proposals will require further detailed analysis and possible revision.  With a long 
transition period during which there will certainly be changes in political leadership in 
the UK, it would be unwise to assume that current proposals will bring an end to the 
process of pension reform in the UK.       18
Chart 1a 
State pension and Pension Credit at 65 for person with male median (age-












State pension and Pension Credit at 65 for person with female median (age-
specific) earnings, caring responsibilities from 26 to 40, retiring at 60, and no 
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Note:      All values are in current prices.    
Source:  Disney, Emmerson and Wakefield (2001), updated HM Revenue and Customs Statistics, (Tables 7.1 and 
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